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1. Introduction: Why Things Stink
What is the ﬁrst thing you do when you open a box of milk, especially if it has stayed a
few days longer in the fridge andmay have gone off? You take a whiff. Although popular
opinion sticks to the idea that the human sense of smell is declining and unimportant,
this is a blatant misconception.¹ Your nose actually is the most accurate and sensitive
chemosensor on earth. It detects the slightest changes in the chemical composition
of your environment, and it does so with striking precision. A difference in one atom
of two otherwise perfectly similar molecules can cause your perception of their odour
quality to vary entirely. For instance, take nonanoic acid (CH₃(CH₂)₇COOH;
Figure 17.1a), which smells of cheese. If you add only one carbon atom, you get decanoic
acid (CH₃(CH₂)₈COOH; Figure 17.1b), which you will perceive distinctly different, as
smelling rancid!
While your olfactory system is mind-bogglingly precise in its capacity to detect the
slightest changes in chemical variation, it is also incredibly ﬂexible in its processing.
Think about the wide range of responses to smells: certain odours evoke an imme-
diate and almost universal dis-liking (e.g., the smell of cadaverine, NH₂(CH₂)₅NH₂, is
not something you will consider pleasant), but many other odours tend to carry
individually variable associations—variable depending on their familiarity and on
memories of previous encounters.
This dual character, the ﬂexibility of perceptual interpretation in parallel with the
precision of its molecular detection mechanism, makes olfaction an excellent model
system for renewing philosophical attention to perception. Perceptual analysis has
traditionally concentrated on visual perception. In recent years, the neglect of what is
¹ The most popular and persistent opinions about our sense of smell are that it is declining, that it is
evolutionary unimportant to humans, and that other animals such as dogs are much better at smelling.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Neither is the sense of smell declining nor is the human sense of
smell considerably worse than the olfactory abilities of dogs. For a popular science account of smell and for
debunking such myths, see Gilbert 2008; Shepherd 2012; and Barwich 2016; for a scientiﬁc review of the
importance of the olfactory system in molecular biology and neuroscience, see Firestein 2001; Shepherd
2004; and Barwich 2015b.
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often referred to as ‘the other senses’ has started to become a matter of correction,
though.² Nonetheless, olfaction remains the most neglected sense among these
laudable developments.
Smell has long constituted the problem child for philosophers of perception
because of its apparent lack of representational capacities. Odours are experienced,
but in what way does this constitute representational content? This question has been
traditionally addressed by debating the representational nature of odours as corres-
ponding to objects (see the essays in the thematic issue of Keller and Young 2014).
Such approach centres on the nature of the stimulus as deﬁning perceptual content.
In light of recent developments in cognitive neuroscience, I propose an alternative to
that view in this chapter.
Perception here is analysed as a process. The thrust of my argument is, in brief, that
we need to abandon a stimulus-centred point of view where we think of smells as stable
percepts that are computationally linked to external objects such as odorous molecules.
There are no stable and intrinsic links between chemicals or input sources and our
perceptions, such as of odour qualities. Denying that input sources are the primary
element in perceptual analysis does not lead to a denial of their causal and functional
signiﬁcance, however. Once this proposition is clear, a very large part of the philo-
sophical motivation to oppose the perceptual model advanced here should vanish.
Instead, we must consider ﬂexible and contextual aspects of the process to understand
what it is that we perceive from odorous molecules through our sense of smell.
Smells, the argument proceeds, are not so much about objects and stable object
perception as about changes in the chemical composition of the environment and
ﬂexibility in terms of its contextual evaluation. In the course of percept formation,
sensory input is ﬁltered and structured by different anticipatory processes. What we
perceive is highly dependent on a signal’s combination with other sensory cues,
previous experiences, and expectations of what options a signal affords.
(a)
(b)
Figure 17.1 Ball-and-stick models of nonanoic acid (A; top), which smells of cheese, and
decanoic acid (B; bottom), which smells rancid (Jynto and Mills 2010a, 2010b). While they
differ only in one carbon atom, this difference is responsible for their distinctly different smells.
² For reviews, see audition (O’Callaghan 2014), touch (Fulkerson 2015), taste and ﬂavour (Smith 2012;
Spence 2013).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/5/2018, SPi
 - 
The informational content of smell must not be analysed as perceptual instances in
terms of classes of ‘odour objects’ (e.g. rose), but with respect to ‘odour situations’
where input cues are integrated in terms of their temporal and contextual associ-
ations with other external sensory cues, internal hidden states (experience and
memory-based, or internally inferred), expectations or predictions, and feedback
processes of error correction. A number of processes can cause certain odour
qualities to become more prominent in a percept, allowing for semantic associations
with previously encountered smells. Other processes facilitate the variability of
semantic associations in smell perception. In order to understand the informational
content and identify the perceptual dimensions in olfaction we must model odours
after the processes that facilitate signal pattern separation and completion.
In this chapter I elaborate on the scientiﬁc foundations and philosophical implica-
tions of this idea. That said, the perspective on perception advanced in what follows is
not meant to carve out olfaction as necessarily different from the visual or auditory
systems. Rather, it is intended to reﬁne our perspective on the variable factors that
determine perceptual content. Olfaction in this context bears interest, as it seems to
possess a less intuitive perceptual structure than vision and, as a result, a less
deceptively straightforward relation between sensory input and perceptual content.
The starting point of this chapter is to engage with the received view in philo-
sophical studies that considers the distal stimulus as the central element for the
analysis of perceptual content (Lycan 2000; Batty 2010a, 2912b, 2013; Keller and
Young 2014; Keller 2016). Having outlined what constitutes the general challenge
here, namely the inadequacy of talk about odour objects, I turn to current scientiﬁc
studies on the neural basis of olfaction. These studies highlight the non-linearity of
stimulus processing and demonstrate the impact of top-down mechanisms in olfac-
tion, and I analyse these experimental developments in the context of an alternative
framework as emerging in cognitive neuroscience. The central proposal here is to
model the brain in terms of two complementary and simultaneous processes as the
integrated proximal stimulus: perceptual bias as anticipation and bias correction as
revision. I conclude with a disambiguation of the different meanings of anticipatory
processes that regulate perception; and I present perception as a process that
measures changing signal ratios in the environment and is shaped by expectancy
effects in perceptual content formation.
2. The Received View: The Input Determines
the Perceptual Experience
In some ways the philosophical analysis of perception used to suffer from the same
problems as certain parts of theoretical physics: concepts originate purely from theory,
and there often is no way to see how foolproof the grounds for the relevant theoretical
convictions really are without guided experimental manipulation. Contemporary
philosophy of perception has experienced a great deal of change and challenges in
parallel with the rise of cognitive neuroscience over the past decade, however. The
essential tension surrounds the double understanding and analysis of perception
(1) as a representation of external objects (distal stimulus) and (2) as a result of the
neural processes generating stimulus patterns (proximal stimulus).
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Take the common-sense idea that our perceptions are shaped by what we perceive:
we consider our perceptions to be representations of objects and their features in the
world. Philosophers of perception have been careful not to confound perceptual
representation with neural representation, and instead have focused on the distal
stimulus input as the measure by which we must judge the content of our percep-
tions. What are the grounds for this view, and what reason is there to reconsider the
relation between perceptual and neural representation?
Let’s start with the traditional philosophical notion of a ‘percept’. Although there
seems to be no formal deﬁnition of what a percept is, it is commonly used to refer to
the perceptual experience that results from the act of perceiving. Our percepts are
considered to be about things in the world, and understanding this aboutness or
intentionality of perception is one of the major occupations in philosophical dis-
course (Peacocke 2008). For example, my perception of the cup of coffee in front of
me is going to tell me something about it, such as its colour, shape, and size. But how
shall we model and analyse the content of our perceptual attention to the world?
The philosophical literature has produced numerous arguments on this topic (for
a review, see Crane and French 2016). Large parts of the debate concern whether such
perceptual experiences are truthful or accurate representations of the things we
perceive in the world (Akins 1996). Central to this inquiry is the distinction between
perceptual appearance and reality. What unites the bulk of philosophical arguments
on this topic is a concern about the source of perception and its elemental primacy
for perceptual analysis. The shared hypothesis about the directionality of the per-
ceptual process is clear: the input structures the perceptual content. What does that
mean? And does this apply to olfaction?
The common-sense idea that perception is about objects originates from our
dominantly ‘visuocentric’ theories. It has led some philosophers of mind to the
question of what might constitute ‘odour objects’. Four suggestions are offered in
the literature: (i) smells represent ordinary objects (like roses, wine, or Brussels
sprouts); (ii) smells represent clouds of odorous molecules; (iii) smells represent
chemical features of molecules; or (iv) smells may be purely subjective phenomeno-
logical experiences or sensations that do not present us with propositions specifying
particular objects in the world (for different positions, see Lycan 2000; Batty 2010a,
2010b; Keller and Young 2014). Analysis here centres on the assessment of percep-
tual ‘object failure’, meaning ‘the failure of an experience to present objects accur-
ately’ (or to present any objects at all; see Batty 2010b: 10).³
A lot of arguments in this debate concern the effect of the visual presence of a
source object on olfactory experience (particularly in the work of Lycan and Batty).
Notably, this effect has been characterized by the olfactory physiologist Hans
Henning as early as in 1916. Henning drew a conceptual distinction between ‘the
true odor [Gegebenheitsgeruch], which is obtained by the observer who is smelling
with closed eyes and is ignorant of the nature of the scent, and the object smell
[Gegenstandsgeruch], which (like color) is projected upon the objects from which it is
³ Alternatively, a discussion about the question of whether we can perceive absences in olfaction as
being objectless can be found in Roberts 2015.
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known to come and apt to be distorted by associative supplementing’ (Henning in
Gamble’s translation, in Gamble 1921: 292). Eleanor Gamble’s translation of the
German Gegebenheitsgeruch as ‘the true odor’ is misleading, however, as the literal
meaning is ‘the situation odour’. For Henning, such perceptual effects presented
important methodological factors for psychophysical measurement, not a measure of
the ‘truthfulness’ of odour objects.
There are several philosophical difﬁculties involved in deﬁning olfactory object-
hood (for an extensive analysis, see Keller 2016). Some of the arguments about the
nature of odour objects, namely for their being (ii) clouds of molecules or (iii)
particular features of molecules, fail to distinguish between the stimulus as the
cause of perception and the perceptual object as the content of perception. This
view also runs into scientiﬁc problems. To date, there are no known structure–odour
relationship rules (i.e. regularities linking speciﬁc chemical features and the smell of a
molecule), and the causal features of odorants (i.e. the odorous molecules) are
dependent on receptor behaviour, not vice versa (Barwich 2015a, 2015b; Poivet
et al. 2016). Moreover, and as I explain in the next section, smell is not only
determined by molecule–receptor interactions, but is also signiﬁcantly dependent
on higher-level brain processes.
Arguments for (i) (i.e. a semantic understanding of odour objects as ordinary
objects) run into trouble as well. Sufﬁce it to say that some smells, such as artistic
perfumes, do not necessarily have associations with ordinary objects. Even ordinary
objects give off hundreds of odorants, and each one is not only different from the
others but also distributed from its source at a different temporal scale from theirs
(this is also the basic principle in the composition of alcohol-based perfumes).
A layered account for odour objects as being a combination of semantic (= (i)) and
causal (= (ii), (iii)) objecthood does not present an intuitive or clear criterion for an
odour object either. ‘Layered’ means, according to Lycan (2014), that odour percep-
tions can be veridical in two independent ways: ﬁrst, on a lower-level account of
representation in terms of its causal objects (i.e. I perceive, correctly, the presence of a
cloud of molecules as the causal object); and, second, on a higher-level account of
representation in terms of its semantic associations (i.e. I perceive, correctly, a cloud
of molecules as a rose). Such a model of differentiating the truth values of (i) and (ii),
(iii) remains far too uninformative and further runs into trouble once we consider the
different variables regarding the distal stimulus as well as its associated semantic
content. For example, the attempt to link the smell of ordinary objects such as roses
to particular (clouds of) molecules (or their features) is
[a]n innocent approach when we know that the scent of a rose comprises hundreds of different
molecules and that none of them smells like a rose. So far I have not found ‘the’ rose molecule,
but I have discovered that the smells of ﬂowers have a biologically dictated cycle, and that their
composition can vary signiﬁcantly without them losing their identity.
(Ellena 2012: Cabris, Thursday 22 July 2010)⁴
⁴ To be sure, the basic rose smell is more likely composed of dozens, not hundreds, of molecules. The
main point of this statement remains valid, however.
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A dominant focus on veridical object representation in perceptual analysis further
falls short of several key aspects of olfactory experience. First, it ignores the purpose
of smelling: ‘Stimulus representation isn’t the primary business of olfaction. Rather,
its job is solving a problem of valuation, rapidly encoding the biological salience of a
stimulus and priming our multisensory representation of it to contextually appro-
priate action’ (Castro and Seeley 2014: 1). As other philosophers and scientists have
pointed out (Burge 2010; Keller 2016), the biological function of perception is prior
to representational accuracy in an evolutionary reading of sensory systems. Percep-
tions here are primarily understood to facilitate the achievement of organismal goals
such as the four Fs (ﬁghting, ﬂeeing, feeding, and courtship). While the truthful
representation of the world can coincide with the achievement of these biological
functions, it need not.
Second, object-centred representational analysis remains indeterminate and mis-
leading with respect to the perceptual dimensions and the structure of olfactory
experience.⁵ What is the structure of odour perceptions? To be sure, olfactory
information is spatially and temporarily structured in the environment. In humans
and other animals it can be used for navigation and active exploration (Porter et al.
2007), and we recognize temporal patterns of changes in the olfactory environment
on shorter and longer scales, such as circadian and annual ﬂuctuations of smells
(Keller 2016). That said, we must be careful not to equate the external structure of a
signal with the structure of our perceptual experience.
Human olfaction is generally characterized as being temporal but as lacking spatial
dimensions in its perceptual content. It is temporal in a phenomenological sense, as
smells appear to be perceived now, and they act as an indicator of the presence of
something. Olfaction is also temporal, in the sense that we perceive important
changes in the chemical constitution of our environment. As we are constantly
surrounded by hundreds of airborne molecules, our olfactory system is tuned to
this situation by quickly adapting to stable ratios of odorants, so that neural popu-
lations ﬁre more actively when novel stimuli are encountered. In comparison, spatial
structure in perception is characterized as exhibiting perceptual relations in terms of
position, orientation, or directness (Keller 2016). As odours do not exhibit such
spatial structuring and ‘we do far less of that sort of objectiﬁcation’ in olfaction, this
has led some philosophers to believe that ‘smell, in humans, is informationally very
poor’ (Lycan 2000: 277) and lacks ‘articulate individuation’ (Lycan 2000: 282).
Such a judgement conveys a blatant misunderstanding of what olfaction is for.
Information is an ambiguous and multifaceted notion, especially with respect to
organisms and their sensory systems. I ask you instead, how many different smells
can you perceive? Scientiﬁcally speaking, olfactory quality space is multiscaled and
consists of hundreds or thousands of different odours (though the precise number
and the usefulness of counting are matters of debate; see Bushdid et al. 2014;
Meister 2015; and Magnasco et al. 2015). Furthermore, why do you consider
an odour to be pleasant or unpleasant (and when or for how long)? It is rather
⁵ I have argued in more detail elsewhere why I consider object-centred representational analyses of
smells to be ill informed with regard to categories of sensory measurement (Barwich 2014).
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curious how much the hedonic tone of odours seems to escape philosophical ideas
about perception; one might blame this on the heritage of the Enlightenment’s
mirthless philosophy of the senses (Classen et al. 1994). Likewise, how much does
the context of your encounter with a stimulus and its combination with other
sensory cues shape its perceptual content? The most obvious example of the
informational richness and context-sensitivity in olfactory perception is the com-
plexity of ﬂavours (Shepherd 2012, Smith 2012, Spence 2013). Your perception of
food and beverage ﬂavour is dominated by your sense of smell, more speciﬁcally
retro-nasal (or mouth-breathing) olfaction. Humans have developed highly
sophisticated discriminatory abilities when it comes to ﬂavours.
Overall, such a differentiated account of perceptual information invites us to
rethink our standard approach to perception. Regarding the inadequacy of talk
about odour objects, other philosophers have suggested adopting suggestion (iv)
and simply rejecting an object-representational account, viewing smells as subjective
phenomenological experiences or as ‘feels’ that are somewhat ‘free-ﬂoating’ or ‘object-
less’ (Batty 2010a, 2010b). It remains unclear what precise understanding of odours is
gained through this proposal, however. Detaching philosophical analysis of smell
from objects and seeing perceptions as mere sensations does not account for the
purpose of odour perception as a measure of chemical changes in your environment.
It does not explain how we should understand the role of the stimulus as an
informational signal for a speciﬁc sensory system. Thus this chapter advocates that
the structure of the perceptual image must be modelled after the processes it serves.
But what are these processes? And how can we think about the informational
dimensions of signals in terms of sensory systems and their regulatory principles?
3. The Neural Basis of Olfaction and the Idea
of Forecasting in Perception
Input-centred modelling of the senses has not been restricted to philosophical debate.
Its equivalent in neuroscience is the view that the organization of a sensory system
such as the visual or the auditory one is shaped primarily by the incoming signal.
Basically, this expresses the idea that external stimuli are recognized by our sensory
systems and translated into internal representations by means of topographically
organized brain activation patterns that further facilitate behavioural responses to
certain stimuli. The resulting input–output model of perception has been crucial for
successful developments in visual research, especially throughout the 1980s and
1990s (Marr 2010 [1982]), as well as inﬂuencing research on other sensory systems
such as olfaction (Davis and Eichenbaum 1992).
Meanwhile this standard bottom-up version of computationalism has been chal-
lenged and modiﬁed.⁶ Over the past decade, sensory and computational neuroscience
⁶ The implicitly unidirectional and monocausal input-to-output interpretation of sensory processing
has elicited various criticisms and suggested alternatives over the years, especially in philosophy. Most
prominently, theories of action, enactivism, and embodiment have argued against the differentiation
between perception, body, and the environment (for an extensive review, see Hurley 2001). Overall,
these theories view the body as a condition and constraint for forming percepts so that we are able to
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has provided much more advanced models and analysis of higher-level brain pro-
cessing. While we should not equate the analysis of the sensory processes with the
phenomenological character of its perceptual products per se, the neural pathways
are the basis on which we must build and correct our perceptual theories. What is
more, by identifying and analysing current questions in contemporary neuroscience,
we gain a much more detailed and informative picture of what kinds of questions we
must ask in order to reconsider some philosophical approaches to perception.
Olfaction, again, presents us with a salient case for this.
As a rough sketch (see Figure 17.2), the olfactory pathway is structured as follows
(for a review, see Firestein 2001). Odorants are ﬁrst detected by receptors situated on
the sensory nerves in the nasal epithelium. All olfactory sensory neurons expressing
one particular receptor gene (encoding a receptor type) are then collected in spherical
Nasal Epithelium
Spatially
distributed
Receptor
Types
Spatially
discrete
organization
of activation
patterns
Olfactory Bulb
Glomeruli
?x
x
x y
yy
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Figure 17.2 Sketch of information ﬂow in the olfactory pathway. Odorants activate receptors
situated on the sensory nerves in the nasal epithelium. Receptors are randomly spatially
distributed across the mucous. All sensory nerves expressing one receptor gene (coding for a
type) are collected in neural spherical structures called glomeruli. As a result, odors here are
represented as spatially discrete activation patterns. The synaptic organization of the piriform
cortex remains an unresolved issue to date.
interact with our environment through sensory experiences. Or, more brieﬂy put, the state of your body
affects the state of your perception and, in turn, of your cognition. On this account, behavioural or motor
output and sensory input are coupled and analysed in relation to each other (Varela et al. 1991; Hurley
1998; O’Regan and Noë 2001; and Noë 2004). I have decided to exclude analysis of embodiment ideas in
this chapter, for reasons not only of length and focus, but also of appropriateness: strong theories of
embodiment that view perception as being somewhat in the body and out of our heads (Noë 2009) simply
fail to resonate with numerous clinical cases, for example where certain disorders in the right-brain
hemisphere can cause feelings of disembodiment in patients (see ch. 3 in Sacks 1998). However, I agree
with weaker theories of embodiment that emphasize sensorimotor aspects of sensory systems as inﬂuen-
cing perception (e.g. the effects of snifﬁng patterns on odour perception). One can be of a divided opinion
as to whether sensorimotor effects require such an extensive theoretical treatment as in the case of the
embodiment movement. In fact some psychologists have objected that the ‘basic principles from embodi-
ment theory are either unacceptably vague (e.g., the premise that perception is inﬂuenced by the body) or
they offer nothing new (e.g., cognition evolved to optimize survival, emotions affect cognition, perception–
action couplings are important)’ (Goldinger et al. 2016: 959). I remain agnostic on this issue in this chapter.
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neural structures (so-called glomeruli) in the olfactory bulb (at the frontal lobe of
your brain). At the bulb level, a neat activation pattern shows up (Vassar et al. 1994;
Mombaerts et al. 1996). This pattern represents the range of receptors that are
activated by certain chemical features of the distal stimulus. So you will get a different
activation pattern for a musk molecule from the one you will get for a citrus
molecule. Now, as with the visual system, this topographic organization of the bulb
was expected to be maintained throughout further processing stages, and the expect-
ation was to ﬁnd a corresponding topography in the olfactory cortex (Axel 2005). It
turns out that this may not be the case.
Olfactory scientists have struggled to ﬁnd any such topographic organization over
the past ten years (Stettler and Axel 2009; Mori et al. 2006). Their efforts have largely
concentrated on the so-called piriform cortex, which constitutes the largest part of
the olfactory cortex. It was long assumed to be the centre of odour object formation.
This means that the piriform was considered to be the domain in the brain where
olfactory signals are combined into a uniﬁed odour percept. While the piriform
cortex does not present us with stable input maps like the bulb, it has been shown to
respond to different sorts of organizational regulation, however.
On the one hand, there are ﬁndings that suggest that the piriform cortex can
get trained into forming more or less temporally stable patterns through innate as
well as through learned behaviour (associated with smells). This strategy is pursued
for instance in Richard Axel’s lab. Taking full advantage of the experimental
possibilities offered by novel techniques such as optogenetics, Axel’s team traces
olfactory signalling from the bulb to the piriform cortex via the amygdala as a sort of
‘relay’ station (Root et al. 2014). The amygdala is part of the limbic system and deeply
involved in processes of memory formation, decision-making, and affective responses.
On the other hand, an alternative model is to ‘reverse engineer’ and ask what the
signal is for (i.e. trace its efferent connections) rather than ask where it comes from
(i.e. trace its afferent connections). This strategy is employed by Stuart Firestein’s lab.
Firestein’s team was looking at projections from two higher-level domains in the
orbitofrontal cortex (the agranular insula and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex) back to
the piriform cortex. And indeed, the team found two distinct neural populations with
a largely non-overlapping topographic organization (Chen et al. 2014).
To what extent these ﬁndings will converge in a uniﬁed model of olfactory
processing is an empirical question, and it presents an exciting prospect for further
research in olfaction. There may or may not be a central domain of synthesizing or
unifying olfactory experience. What these approaches have in common thus far is a
shared focus on behaviour and learning as fundamental to the formation of odour
objects. The amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex in particular are domains notable
for their involvement and centrality in decision-making processes and sensory
integration (Shadlen and Kiani 2013; Castro and Seeley 2014).
For philosophical studies of perception, these are interesting experimental devel-
opments. They highlight the non-linearity of stimulus activation and representation
and demonstrate the impact of top-down neural processing in olfaction. While
research on smell lacks a general theory of its subsystems (integrating studies of
receptor, bulb, and cortex activity), these experimental inquiries resonate with a
general tendency in cognitive neuroscience that has started to pursue an alternative
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framework for modelling perception and cognition. The growing trend is to think of
behavioural systems in computational terms.
While there is no real consensus about theories of the brain to date, there is
convergence on what aspects a genuinely alternative conceptual framework for
neural processing must build on: bias and revision. ‘Bias’ refers to the formation of
anticipations and preferences through previous experiences, and revisions are pro-
cesses where these biases are continuously corrected.
Consider a great example of perceptual biases introduced by top-down processing:
the role of expectations in ﬂavour perception. Here we encounter numerous phe-
nomena where the perception of colour or texture in foods and beverages affects our
judgement about the perceived gustatory qualities of these foods and beverages. In
one study, test subjects were given two beverages of the same chemical composition,
one being of a brighter colour than the other. Subjects perceived the brighter
beverage as sweeter and more intense (Bayarri et al. 2001). Another study appears
to ridicule sommeliers and wine tasters who were given wines to test and describe.
The subjects in this study were presented with red wines that, unbeknownst to them,
were in fact just white wines laced with red food colour. The tasters proceeded to
attribute traditional red wine properties to these white wines (Hodgson 2008).
What perceptual puzzles such as these suggest is that seemingly higher-level pro-
cesses should not be taken as separable modules in the cognitive architecture. They are
an integral part of our basic perceptual processing instead. As has become clear by now,
perception is not exclusively or even primarily determined by input. Most notably, this
is where data from the neural pathway and psychophysical studies of perception
converge. What we perceive with the help of our sensory systems is multilayered and
multiprocessual: perception is dependent on a signal’s combination with other sensory
cues, previous experiences, and expectations about the kinds of options this signal
affords. These different processual layers are constitutive of the perceptual architecture
and the selective biases in percept formation. But how can we model and analyse such
seemingly bidirectional causal character of information ﬂow in sensory processing?
Over the past ﬁfty years, a number of neuroscientists have suggested models of
neural networks that build on these two processes, anticipation and revision, as
complementary mechanisms. In these models, your brain works like a neuro-
computer that copes with the plethora of sensory information by predicting stimulus
regularities through previous experiences. These sensory regularities provide percep-
tual templates by which your brain continuously generates an internal virtual model
or a simulation of the environment (Friston 2010; Graziano 2013).
To generate such a model, the brain operates by two complementary and simul-
taneous mechanisms of top-down and bottom-up processing. ‘Top-down processing’
refers to the information ﬂow from the higher cortical areas to the lower sensory
domains. This top-down mechanism makes predictions about the environment on
the basis of prior experience of stimulus regularities, and its activity results in so-
called ‘forward models’. By comparison, bottom-up processing describes the infor-
mation ﬂow of stimulus input from lower sensory areas to higher-level brain
domains. Most crucially, the function of the incoming input from this bottom-up
mechanism is deﬁned as an error correction of the forward model. What precisely
such top-down processes are and what constitutes the content of predictions is not
obvious, as I will explain over the course of what follows.
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Similar models of the brain as a perceptual forecasting machine have permeated
motor theories for decades (Bridgeman 1995, 2013). For example, one of the most
salient examples for the role of sensorimotor prediction in perception is a phenom-
enon that was ﬁrst described in the nineteenth century (Bell 1974 [1823]; Purkinje
1825; Helmholtz 1925 [1866]) and later, in the mid-twentieth century, became
known as ‘efference copy’ (Holst and Mittelstaedt 1950; Sperry 1950). Efference
copy describes an effect where your brain creates a forward copy of your sensori-
motor system, anticipating your movement in order to provide stability in motion
perception (Bridgeman 2007).
More recently, the idea of the brain as a forecasting processor has entered cognitive
neuroscience and philosophy under labels such as the theory of predictive coding, or
the Bayesian brain (Friston 2010; Clark 2013; Hohwy 2013), but also as attention
schema theory (Graziano 2013). The essential components for such theories have
been around for several decades and in various disciplines. The importance of
schemata as perceptual anticipations in perceptual cycles and revision was put
forward most prominently by the cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser (1976), a
close colleague and ofﬁce neighbour of James J. Gibson at Cornell.
While the various subtleties and differences in different theoretical accounts of
forecasting mechanisms need not concern us here, what essentially uniﬁes these
approaches, in my view, is a shared outlook on the nature of perception and
cognition as inherently processual. In forecasting models, perceptual analysis is not
centred on the idea of stable piecemeal perceptual images of the world as represen-
tative of external objects. Rather, it concerns the dynamics between anticipation and
correction in perception, and the processes that constitute the formative mechanisms
of learning and revision. Such a dynamic picture accounts for the ﬂexibility with
which organisms are able to react to a variety of environmental changes.
In this perspective, the links between input and output processing are deeply
intertwined and cyclical. Their analytic differentiation is not so much of a sequential
as of a functionally complementary nature. Therefore the ﬁrst step here is to
acknowledge the central difference from the received view, where we saw the
perceptual images as a product at the end of the line of the perceptual mechanism.
The ﬂaw of the received view is that it obscures the constant ﬂux that directs
perceptual processes. Or, in Dennett’s (1993: 253) words: ‘[t]his is like forgetting
that the end product of apple trees is not apples—it’s more apple trees.’ This, too,
holds true for perceptual analysis if we are forgetting that the end product of
perception is not percepts—it is the ongoing perceptual processing.
When we analyse perceptions in terms of such forecasting processes, our percep-
tual images are not shaped exclusively by the external input but are strongly affected
by our anticipations, experiences, and the information context. Anticipatory pro-
cesses are not some isolated effects at the end of higher-level cognitive processing.
Rather, they resonate with neural mechanisms that constantly feed back into lower
sensory domains and thereby inﬂuence the biochemical effects that produce our
perceptual impressions. That said, discarding the primacy of input as structuring our
perceptual experience does not mean that the stimulus does not play any role at all,
only that its role must be modelled after the processes in which it participates.
It is one thing to say that the formation of percepts is informed by signal input
but shaped by top-down processing. It is another to highlight the concrete aspects of
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top-down processing that beneﬁt our understanding of perception as processes. To
put some ﬂesh on the bones of this idea, I present the case of an alleged ‘olfactory
illusion’ in the next section, before ending with the concrete philosophical questions
that result from a perceptual model based on processes instead of objects. Ambiguous
meanings of anticipation are the easiest place where we can situate prospective work
for philosophers of perception—work complementary to current developments in
cognitive neuroscience.
4. The Interactivity of Forecasting and Stimulus
Input in Perception
The picture of the general framework sketched above is permissive and allows for
several levels of description in perceptual analysis with respect to the neural and
mental processes. In essence, the perceptual architecture we arrive at here is a
relational and temporally scaffolded one: perceptual relations are built over several
neural processing levels and temporal scales, where some anatomical, physiological,
and experiential constituents of the perceptual process are more variable, contextual,
or short-lived than others (e.g. exposure time to stimulus, satiety, hormonal states,
anatomical features). Stimuli are encountered in manifold organismal states and in
various behavioural and environmental contexts. In consequence, they are processed
differently as they become integrated into multiple experiences and memories, and
can constitute varying perceptions. The complex role of anticipatory processes in the
formation of perceptual content cannot be underestimated. An example may help to
further illustrate this.
Imagine the following experiment, where I present you with a couple of odorous
mixtures for evaluation. First I am giving you a vial to sniff that you see labelled as
‘Parmesan’; then I give you one labelled as ‘vomit’. You will most likely be able to
distinguish these mixtures; and you will probably ﬁnd the latter much more dis-
agreeable. I then repeat the same test a week later, only this time making you smell
the ‘vomit’ vial ﬁrst and giving you the one with ‘parmesan’ next. You will still be able
to tell them apart, ﬁnding the former more unpleasant this time. What if I tell you
now that these two vials are the same mixture? Both vials contain butyric acid
(CH₃CH₂CH₂-COOH) with its deeply unpleasant and penetrant odour. Your expect-
ations and the associations formed through the labels, however, inﬂuenced your
perception of these otherwise chemically equivalent mixtures.⁷
Indeed, such an experiment, analysing the ‘inﬂuence of verbal labeling on the
perception of odors’ (as the title of the article indicates), has been conducted, for
instance, by Herz and von Clef (2001). In this study the two researchers tested several
odours by pairing, for evaluation, two vials with mixtures of the same chemical
composition but with different names (Table 17.1). The result was precisely the
one described above: the vast majority of human test subjects (83 per cent) were
able to distinguish the mixtures in each round and attributed different hedonic tones
(pleasant or unpleasant) to these mixtures. Similar observations have also been
⁷ Theories of embodiment do not seem to provide a good explanation for such cases.
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made regarding the inﬂuence of visual clues in olfactory perception (Zellner and
Kautz 1990).
Herz and von Clef call this effect an olfactory ‘illusion’. While it may count as one
according to the received view, I ﬁnd this kind of labelling of perceptual effects
theory-laden and misleading. The judgement or verdict that something is an illusion
conveys an inherent element of deception and divergence from how things ‘really’
are. To speak of an illusion in this particular experiment seems intuitive only if we
consider the distal stimulus as primarily responsible for the content of our percep-
tions. However, the argument of the present chapter shows that this is not the only
viable interpretation of the apparently illusionary effects. Quite to the contrary, such
perceptual biases touch base on what perceptions are.
Examples like these show that our experience of perceptual qualities is inevitably
biased. These biases are not necessarily a matter of illusion, hallucination, or decep-
tion and must not be stripped away in order to get at some underlying form of
normal and unbiased perception. In fact, there is no such thing as naïve perception.
Perceptual biases are rather introduced by key factors such as exposure, predilections,
and memory. Hence biases mark constitutive processes that allow us to understand
what perception really is about: the processing of contextualized information at the
hands of selective attention.
In recognizing the impact of top-down processes on percept formation, an insufﬁ-
ciently elaborated aspect in the current debate about the brain as a forecasting machine
Table 17.1. Odour labels and hedonic order by group and session. Comparative list
of odourous mixtures that were presented to test subjects under two different labels.
The evaluation of the hedonic tone (pleasantness) of the mixtures corresponded with
the positive or negative semantic labelling of these mixtures.
Odorant Label, session 1 Label, session 2 Hedonic order
Group 1
I – B acid parmesan cheese vomit positive, negative
Menthol chest medicine breath mint negative, positive
Patchouli musty basement incense negative, positive
Violet leaf fresh cucumber mildew positive, negative
Pine oil spray disinfectant Christmas tree negative, positive
Group 2
I – B acid vomit parmesan cheese negative, positive
Menthol breath mint chest medicine positive, negative
Patchouli incense musty basement negative, positive
Violet leaf mildew fresh cucumber positive, negative
Pine oil Christmas tree spray disinfectant positive, negative
Source: Herz and von Clef 2001
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is the ambiguous meanings and varieties of top-down processes such as anticipa-
tions.⁸ As a general term, anticipation refers to the ability of an organism to expect,
adapt, and react to potential future states of the environment. Anticipation is not a
homogeneous mechanism, however. It is a processing capacity that is commonly
associated with a variety of fundamental cognitive mechanisms such as inference-
and decision-making, prediction, learning, memory, and belief formation (Butz,
Sigaud, and Gérard 2003). Needless to say, each of these processes presents a case of
Pandora’s box in its own right.
While anticipatory performances in organisms are ubiquitous, they are not par-
ticularly well-understood phenomena. They are generally considered in systems-
biological terms, for instance an organism as an anticipatory system is deﬁned as ‘a
system containing a predictive model of itself and/or of its environment, which
allows it to change state at an instant in accord with the model’s predictions
pertaining to a later instant’ (Rosen 2012: 399).
What current forecasting models in computational neuroscience focus on is the
ﬁrst part of this deﬁnition, namely the part where the system generates a predictive
model of the stimulus environment (Clark 2013). But the second part, where the
organism changes state in accordance with its anticipations, requires more careful
attention than is presently given. By focusing on the former, one essentially neglects
(a) the phenomenological and functional nature of perceptions as an incentive for
organismal agency; and (b) the ecological relation between perceivers and input
signals as part of an organism’s environment.
Indeed, there is a fascinating aspect to this deﬁnition of organisms as anticipatory
systems. Its two parts seem to represent a combination of Neisser’s (1976) dynamic
account of schemata as part of perceptual cycles with the ecological and exploration-
oriented theory of affordances advanced by his colleague Gibson (1966), who con-
sidered the content of perceptions as structured by the interactive relations that an
organism forms with its environment.⁹ It seems that a dynamic modelling of said
schemata in terms of different kinds of anticipatory processes may work here, as
Neisser characterized the causal nature of dynamic anticipatory schemata on per-
ceptions as ‘expectancy effects’ (Neisser 1976: 43–6).¹⁰
Anticipatory capacities in organisms clearly structure behavioural and cognitive
patterns. They further seem to facilitate various kinds of perceptual tasks, tasks that
⁸ As has been pointed out to me by a reviewer, a process model of perception involving anticipation
has been independently suggested by Bickhard (2009). Bickhard frames representations as an emergent
feature of perceptual systems and as a result of interactive relations between an organism and its
environment. Bickhard’s focus is on the relation between anticipation and truth values for the represen-
tational analysis of perception. Mine is on the role of anticipation in affecting perceptual content for
understanding and modelling the structure of perceptions, especially in olfaction. Unlike me, Bickhard
does not seem to distinguish different kinds of anticipatory processes as deﬁned by their ecological and
action-(in)dependent functions.
⁹ To be sure, Gibson was clearly opposed to schemata, and his idea of ‘direct perception’ seems to be at
odds here. Nonetheless, one must refrain from a simplistic interpretation of direct realism as a form of the
‘textbook Gibson’ syndrome (for detailed analysis of how much Gibson’s ideas have been misrepresented
in the psychological literature, see Costall and Morris 2015).
¹⁰ I thank Ingvar Johansson for pointing this out to me. A more detailed exploration of this idea must
wait for another occasion, however.
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are mirrored in organismal behaviour such as general object and environmental
feature recognition, or the recognition of particular individuals and groups. It is thus
indispensable to distinguish different types of anticipatory processes in relation to
different behavioural patterns and perceptual tasks in organisms.
What are the implications of anticipatory processes for our analysis of perception?
The answer to this lies in inquiries about what precisely is coded or estimated in top-
down anticipatory processes and how these anticipations are structured by the task a
perception is supposed to serve. Anticipatory performances are associated with several
prospective mechanisms such as sensorimotor action, expectation, and attention
processing with and behavioural functions such as conditioning and learning. These
mechanisms are associated with different tasks. When looking at anticipations as
shaped by different biological mechanisms, we must start by distinguishing their
perceptual function: do we look at anticipations as stabilizing perceptual information
in order to allow for the execution of an action? Do we analyse anticipations as guiding
behavioural planning and potential options? Or do we model anticipations as attention
processes that shape or direct our perceptual focus in order to enable learning?
Addressing such questions requires further disentangling of the notion of ‘antici-
pation’ and of its role in perceptual processing: physiologically speaking, we must
consider to what extent action-dependent anticipations may differ from action-
independent anticipations. In evolutionary–developmental terms, we may ask to
what extent anticipatory behaviour is structured by the history of the species or by
the development of an organism. And, in a cognitive modelling context, to what
extent are anticipatory estimations further shaped by individual experience and
learning? All these questions indicate the variety of factors by which anticipatory
processes may be distinguished and modelled in biological systems.
The upshot here is that different types of anticipatory mechanisms account for the
processing of different kinds of information. What all these types of anticipation have
in common is that they involve a form of prediction of future states, a prediction that
is somewhat based on prior experience. The key difference between these various
forecasting mechanisms is the nature of the assertive mechanism in relation to the
information being processed.
From this perspective, we see what it means to say that there is no obvious or
intrinsic link between a stimulus or stimulus structure and our perception of that
stimulus. Rather, we have adjustable perceptual relations where input cues are inte-
grated in terms of their temporal and contextual associations with other external
sensory cues, internal hidden states (experience and memory-based, or internally
inferred), expectations, or predictions, and feedback processes of error correction. As
a result, the perception of the input and its value is not invariant but highly contingent.
5. Conclusions: Perception as a Measure of Changing
Signal Ratios and Expectancy Effects
Higher ﬂexibility in the processing and evaluation of perceptual information such
as in olfaction makes sense when we think of perception as a dynamic process
that organisms use in order to navigate in an ever-changing environment. Such
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navigation commands not only constant attention but also choices between different
options and behaviourally selective responses to contextual clues. It would actually be
catastrophic for most of our choices if we were to perceive stimuli in a strict input–
output-related fashion, without any regulatory principles that allow us to context-
ualize and discern the subtle differences in these cues before we selectively act on
them. Olfaction in particular is deeply action-based and is shaped by perceptual
biases, which makes sensory measurement in olfactory psychophysics notoriously
difﬁcult (Keller and Vosshall 2004; Barwich and Chang 2015).
Nevertheless, emphasis on the ﬂexibility and contextuality of perception is not a
view of ‘anything goes’. The governing principles of perceptual processing are bound
to the physiological organization of organisms, their evolutionary species-speciﬁc
history, and the inﬂuence of individual experiences and learning. These processes are
contingent but not random. After all, we do end up with fairly stable and general-
izable perceptions.
Perceptual stability, as this chapter has put forward, is based on the successful
integration of stimulus clues into experienced and predictable patterns. The regular-
ity of these patterns reﬂects the ratios, combinations, and proportions of selected
features in the environment.¹¹ Their perception is further shaped by how these ratios
are interpreted within organismal response spaces. These spaces represent associ-
ations of sensory cues and of their affective options, and the nature of these
associations depends on the organismal states in which the cues are experienced
and anticipated.
Success, as in the successful integration of stimulus ratios within a sensory system,
is an interesting notion. It inevitably implies some form of evolutionary success. Does
success also imply a notion of correctness? From a process perspective, I think the
answer is not about whether it does, but about when it may imply accuracy. As I have
argued, an answer cannot be approached in terms of odour objects. It must be
modelled after the processes that translate distal into proximal stimulus patterns,
and this translation is fundamentally determined by top-down processes in term of
expectancy effects.
As for the case at hand, olfaction seems particularly apt to analyse the perceptual
relations between variable stimulus ratios, selective biases introduced by experience,
and behavioural responses. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the
olfactory system is incredibly precise at the level of physical stimulus detection (the
smallest chemical impurities can cause signiﬁcant differences in the perception of
odour qualities). It is also immensely ﬂexible when it comes to stimulus evaluation
and integration of olfactory cues into various perceptual contexts, on the basis of
differences in exposure and experience (i.e. in cases of cross-modal perception, verbal
labelling, conditioning, personal experience and memory, and so on). This shows
that perceptual biases are not a failure of the level of sensory detection but an
inherent and constitutive part of the processing system.
¹¹ An epistemological argument for the measurement of sensory qualities as structurally relational
properties is presented in Isaac 2014.
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From a process perspective on perception, perceptual representation is about
informational content. Such content does not necessarily represent perceptual
instances as classes of perceptual objects, for instance as ‘odour objects’. Instead we
experience ‘odour situations’ that provide a measure of how certain cues are related
to each other (e.g. temporally, combinatorially, causally) and are given a certain value
(e.g. pleasant, putrid). What constitutes the informational content of odour situ-
ations is variable and contingent upon the associations that are formed between
certain ratios and combinations of inputs and the expected value of their (potential)
interactions. Any interpretation and the potential for perceptual generalizations of
such measures into kinds of perceptual qualities is grounded in organismal construc-
tion and needs, as well as in experience and learning; it is action-relative as well as
memory-based and must be understood with respect to the interaction of the
perceiving organism with its environment.
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